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Economic Perspective 4 
THE FAILURE OF BEVERIDGE 
Anne Miller 
Department of Economics 
Heriot-Watt University 
"The review of the supplementary 
benefit scheme was announced by 
the Secretary of State for Social 
Services on 2 April 1984. I t i s 
one of four major reviews which 
together constitute a substantial 
re-examination of the s o c i a l 
security system to see if better 
use can be made of resources and 
staff within the present overall 
l e v e l of s o c i a l s e c u r i t y 
expenditure... ." 
Thus began the consul ta t ion document 
"Supplementary Benefit Review" issued by 
the Department of Health and Socia l 
Security on 16 May 1984. Since i t i s 
well known that the social security system 
is in a complete mess, the announcement of 
a substantial re-examination such as this , 
surely, can only be welcomed as a long 
overdue f i r s t s t ep towards a major 
improvement - or can i t ? The 
announcement i t s e l f makes i t quite clear 
that no extra funds will be available, and 
the consultat ion documents continue by 
emphasising the l imited objectives for 
thei r reviews; "to ensure that i t i s as 
simple as possible" (housing benefit) and 
"to consider the scope for easing i t s 
administration" (supplementary benefit). 
I and other scept ics may be forgiven for 
predicting that, in spite of much talk of 
these reviews, and a substantial amount of 
evidence submit ted by the voluntary 
organisations and pressure groups which 
comprise the poverty lobby, prec ious 
l i t t l e wi l l occur that w i l l redress the 
shortcomings of the present system. The 
changes that will be effected will amount 
to a mere t inkering with the system, 
probably redistributing poverty amongst poor 
people in a slightly different way, and this 
administration will probably try to use the 
evidence as an excuse to cut real benefit 
levels even further. 
This uncharacteristic pessimism on my part 
results primarily from the outcome of former 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n s by governments , the 
announcements of which I used to greet with 
optimism. Either the recommendations of 
those inves t igat ions have been ignored 
completely, or the brief for the study was 
so narrow as to preclude any useful 
recommendations. For instance, to what use 
w i l l the enormous amount of evidence 
collected by the Meacher Committee (1983) in 
i t s three volume report "The Structure of 
Personal Income Taxation and Income Support" 
be put? Why was the Tax Credit Scheme in 
the Green Paper on the Taxation of Husband 
and Wife (Cmnd 8093, 1980) not extended to 
cover benefits for husband and wife, so that 
the disaggregation option could have been 
r e a l l y meaningful to married women? 
Similarly with the present reviews, - why 
four separate reviews? - why preclude the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of i n t e g r a t i n g the s o c i a l 
security and taxation systems, as logically 
they should be? The supplementary benefit 
review consultation document claims that i t s 
terms of reference are wide, yet i t s key 
issues for consultation are constrained by 
many assumptions, such as the continuation 
of means-tested benefi ts , and that support 
should continue to be related to detai led 
individual circumstances. The consultation 
documents are concerned only about symptoms 
rather than with seeking insights into the 
causes of the i l l s of our social security 
system. 
So, what i s wrong with our current social 
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secu r i ty system? I t i s complex and 
difficult for claimants and administrators 
al ike to understand. I t s anomalies are 
legion and lead to much inequity and 
injustice. I t i s expensive to administer 
and costly in time, effort , emotional 
energy and in loss of dignity and privacy 
to the r e c i p i e n t s . And yet these 
d e f i c i e n c i e s a r e merely symptons. 
Similarly, the piecemeal attempts over the 
years to t reat the symptoms on the cheap, 
are merely band-aids. The cause goes 
much much deeper, and must be ident i f ied 
as the c e n t r a l design of the system 
itself. The system is merely doing what 
i t i s d e s i g n e d t o do . Thus 
simplif icat ion on i t s own wi l l not cure 
the i l l . In fact , s implif icat ion can 
never be an objective in i t s own right but 
can only provide a decision rule for 
choosing between different methods of 
achieving the same objective! 
Our current system i s broadly based on 
Beveridge's proposal (Cmnd 6404; 1942) for 
a social insurance scheme. He assumed 
that earnings would be the means by which 
most households would avoid f inancial 
poverty, implying in i t s turn that paid 
employment opportunities would always be 
available, supposedly guaranteed by a fast 
growth economy. Even when full employment 
(however defined) and sustained growth are 
achieved, Beveridge's basic reliance on 
earnings to prevent financial poverty 
ignores some painful t r u t h s . Paid 
employment is an arbitrary and inequitable 
distributor of claims to resources, merely 
ref lect ing i n i t i a l human endowments; i t 
cannot n e c e s s a r i l y guarantee to low 
earners an income level suff ic ient for 
physical subsistence: and i t ignores the 
fact that the majority of the population, 
(the 'vulnerable of society') are excluded 
from the labour market on account of 
you th , age , d i s a b i l i t y or c a r i n g 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s for young, s ick or 
infirm. 
The total working population of 26 million 
i s l e ss than half the population of 56 
million for the UK. Beveridge devised a 
national insurance scheme to provide 
compensating income for a temporary 
(unemployment, sickness) or a planned 
(retirement) loss of earnings. This has 
necessitated a rigid employment structure 
categorising people arbitrarily into ful l-
time, part- t ime, self-employed, re t i red 
and unemployment categories, which is not 
only largely i r re levant now, but hinders 
social change towards more f lexible and 
varied work patterns. The poverty of those 
not ca tered for by e i t h e r earnings or 
replacement income was to be relieved by a 
non-cont r ibu tory benef i t ( f i r s t called 
national ass is tance , now supplementary 
benefit), which was to provide a safety net 
for a very small minor i ty of people! 
However, t h i s "minor i ty" i nev i t ab ly 
comprises many of the vulnerables excluded 
from the labour force. The safety net 
merely r ede f ines and pe rpe tua tes new 
categories of poverty. Throughout his 
plans, Beveridge envisaged tha t married 
women would accept and maintain the role of 
mere financial appendages of their husbands. 
Neither the changes in a t t i tudes towards 
women, nor the changes in the i r l i f e s ty l e s 
and aspirations, which have occurred in one 
generation, nor the numbers of single parent 
households, nor the variety of household 
configurations that were to evolve, were 
anticipated. Viewed in this light, one is 
surprised, not by the fact that the system 
f a i l s , but rather that anyone could have 
seriously regarded i t as a working model. 
Having i d e n t i f i e d the cause of the 
malfunctioning to be a major design faul t 
which has corrupted the system, one might 
stand some chance of correcting the faul t . 
But f i r s t , one must define exp l ic i t ly the 
c r i t e r i a that the design of the system i s 
intended to meet. Beveridge's scheme might 
be regarded as aiming to prevent financial 
poverty via earnings, and then to rel ieve 
any incidents that did occur via benefits. 
I think we should set ourselves even higher 
standards. Not only should we ensure that 
financial poverty is prevented, but in the 
same way that we extend political democracy 
to our citizens (even though only on polling 
days), we should extend "economic democracy" 
also. This concept has many facets. The 
r ight to offer one's labour in the market 
place, in return for wages, i s one obvious 
facet . The r ight to the necessaries of 
l i fe i s also important for the vulnerables. 
Yet th i s r ight by i t s e l f i s not enough. 
The right to choose to be an economic agent 
i s also necessary for economic democracy. 
One might wonder why married women with 
caring r e spons ib i l i t i e s , who are thereby 
excluded from the labour market, are not yet 
entitled under the law to enjoy this right. 
Another aspect of economic democracy is the 
r ight to par t ic ipa te in one's community in 
terms of both production and consumption, as 
recognised by Townsend (1979) in h i s 
monumental work "Poverty in the UK", where 
he has defined poverty in terms of exclusion 
and isola t ion from one's usual association 
group. 
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Many of our "economic" problems in the UK 
are problems about our al locat ion of 
claims to basic resources, and come under 
the general heading of d i s t r ibu t iona l 
p r o b l e m s . Both i n f l a t i o n and 
unemployment are f i r s t and foremost 
problems of distribution. I t behoves us 
to face the underlying problem squarely 
and directly at source, thus providing our 
s o c i a l i n f r a s t r u c t u r e wi th a b e t t e r 
balance and more stabil i ty, rather than to 
try to patch up the symptoms as an after-
thought. 
Townsend (1979) identifies three distinct 
general pr inciples which might govern 
a l t e rna t ive pol ic ies for dealing with 
l a r g e sca l e d e p r i v a t i o n or pover ty . 
"Conditional welfare for the few was 
represented by the development of the Poor 
Laws, as ref lected in the Report of the 
Poor Law Commission of 1832 -4 . . . 
Character is t ic of such policy is the 
maximisation of relief through charity and 
voluntary ef for t , and public expenditure 
kept low by the bar r ie r of means t e s t s . " 
This principle persists today in the form 
of supplementary benefit. 
"Minimum rights for the many.... was spelt 
out in the Reports on the Poor Law of 
1909, , and was taken up with renewed 
vigour in the Beveridge Report of 1942, 
with i t s stress on insurance to provide a 
minimum s u b s i s t e n c e as the b a s i s of 
benef i ts . . . . " 
"The t h i r d p r i n c i p l e , d i s t r i bu t iona l 
j u s t i c e for a l l , has not yet been c lear ly 
a r t i c u l a t e d or t r i e d in B r i t a i n . . . . " 
Perhaps we should try this one next? 
Ward Morehouse's General Stock Ownership 
Plan (GSOP) (1984) is an ingenious idea to 
"make everyone a capital is t , and in doing 
so, l e t everyone have a share in the 
income generated by productive assets" , 
s t a r t ing in the USA. Every American 
family would acquire, via government 
guaranteed loans to be repaid out of the 
earnings of the stock, a $100,000 share in 
the new productive asse ts that American 
industry is likely to acquire in the next 
20 years. The stock would yield an 
income for each family, paying out a l l 
p r o f i t s as d iv idends ( in r e t u r n for 
exemption from corporate income tax) . 
This idea gives a c a p i t a l i s t solution, in 
keeping with American c u l t u r e , to the 
problem tha t Marx wanted to solve by the 
communal ownership of capital. 
Another solution to the problem of achieving 
some measure of economic democracy is that 
of the guaranteed minimum income, also known 
as the social dividend, or the basic income 
(Miller; 1984). This does not quite f i t 
into Townsend's three board pr inc ip les , 
being a combination of the second and third, 
providing "minimum rights for all". There 
are many versions of Basic Income Schemes, 
but they are characterised by the following 
principles:-
(a) the individual i s the tax and benefit 
unit; 
(b) each i n d i v i d u a l i s e n t i t l e d to an 
" a d e q u a t e " b a s i c income, pa id 
automatically into his/her account; 
(c) the entitlement is based on citizenship, 
not on 'worth' , and i s universal with 
respect to sex, marital s t a tus , and 
employment s t a t u s . I t could vary 
according to age; 
(d) additional provisions would be made for 
special cases, such as disabled people, 
and for those with exceptional needs, 
which occur i r regular ly , infrequently 
and unpredictably, such as those arising 
from fire or flood. 
Thus each individual receives a regular 
income, which forms the basis on which to 
build further income via earnings. Some 
readers, on meeting this idea for the f i r s t 
time, become concerned that, if a l l receive 
their basic incomes regardless of employment 
s t a tus , everyone (else) may give up work, 
and the economy would fall apart. I t might 
appear that the only solution i s to make the 
right to a basic income conditional on one's 
work status, to coerce people to work, with 
a l l the current problems of judgement, 
discrimination and policing. However, 
advocates of the basic income approach 
prefer carrots to s t i cks . We recognise 
that on the whole people wish to work, to 
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par t ic ipa te in, and contribute to , the i r 
society, and that th i s i s a source of 
great pride to them. Secondly, as we 
have noted in recent years, there are 
s t i l l social stigmas against not working. 
T h i r d l y , t h e r e a r e many p e r s o n a l 
advantages to be gained from working, 
including the opportunity to make friends, 
an ident i ty and s t a tus , job sa t i s fac t ion 
in many jobs, a structure to one's day and 
a purpose in l i f e . Fourthly, if the 
basic income were indexed to a measure of 
economic a c t i v i t y , such as n a t i o n a l 
income, then if th i s should suffer, the 
bas ic income would be reduced, thus 
restoring incen t ives to work harder . 
Fifthly, the basic income principle would 
allow - some would claim that i t i s a 
necessary condition for - a free labour 
market to operate for the f i r s t time, 
where both wages are flexible, and labour 
hour s a r e n e g o t i a b l e . In t h i s 
circumstance, wages are likely to provide 
one of the most s i g n i f i c a n t of a l l 
incentives to work. If an individual is 
tempted to withdraw from the labour market 
for whatever reason and the economy cannot 
do without that individual 's services, 
then the individual's wages rate will rise 
u n t i l his /her price i s reached. On the 
other hand, there will be some situations 
where wage ra tes wi l l f a l l . Thus the 
s t ructure of wage ra tes i s l ikely to be 
different under a basic income system. 
A Basic Income scheme could be financed 
out of taxation. However, the complete 
design of a simple, integrated, d i rec t 
personal taxation and benefit system will 
depend on s o c i e t y ' s pol ic ies on many 
diverse issues, including employment, 
housing, replacement income schemes, 
personal s av ings , and i t s degree of 
redistribution of income and wealth. The 
whole f i sca l system not only provides a 
means of rais ing revenue for government 
expenditure on current consumption and 
investment, but complemented by the other 
essent ia l l e g i s l a t i v e measures, i t i s a 
powerful instrument for the well defined, 
imaginative and humane social pol ic ies 
that the country so urgently needs. 
This art icle does not attempt to provide a 
complete cure for the i l l s of the current 
social security system. I t has attempted 
to identify a more fundamental cause for 
those i l l s than most are prepared to admit 
ex i s t s , and thus i t indicates from where 
one might s t a r t one's search for a 
solution. Even if these reviews should 
c o n s t i t u t e the most s u b s t a n t i a l r e -
examination of the social security system 
since Beveridge, as I have no doubt they 
could in terms of volume of evidence, then 
i t i s not enough. We do not need a r e -
examination; we need another Beveridge, but 
with a new brief! But l e t us take note. 
When Beveridge presented his report in 1942, 
i t was probably already about 30 years out 
of date then. Now i t i s obvious that his 
design is not fulfilling i t s required role, 
and i s h inder ing spontaneous, healthy, 
social development in the community. Let 
us look to the future, and design our fiscal 
system with i t in mind, and as soon as that 
new system i s ope ra t i ng , l e t us s t a r t 
preparing for the next version immediately, 
so that we will not be caught out again with 
another fossilised elephant on our hands. 
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